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Abstract 
In our time, very much attention and intellectual effort are being directed to conflict-
resolution activities in war-torn societies throughout the world. In this aspect, the 
centrality of the UN in terms of post-conflict reconstruction activities is notorious. 
Notoriously, state-building is a key enterprise in regard of addressing the international 
conflicts throughout the globe, being deployed as a key conflict-resolution tool applied 
globally. Although such activities are represented as mere techniques aiming to build 
peace, this peace is intimately associated with the institutionalization of liberal ideas in 
structuring realms such as the political, the economical and the social spheres. Here 
lays the objective of this paper. It aims, from a critical position, to discuss and 
deconstruct this UN model regarding the transformation of the international violent 
conflicts. Departing from Foucauldian concepts such as dispositif, government, 
discipline and biopolitics, it aims to critically analyze the post-conflict state-building 
practice. In a first moment, the paper delineates the conflict resolution mindset which 
state-building is commonly associated with and immersed. In a second moment, it 
seeks to (re)problematize the state-building practice as a post-conflict dispositif, rather 
than merely a conflict-resolution tool, and to interrogate whether (and how) this 
notion can be related with other Foucauldian concepts such as government, discipline 
and biopolitics. 
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A Introduction 
There is no absurd in saying that it is already common-sense that peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and state-building constitute the very core of the international political 
policies in regard of international peace in our time. Their centrality can be sensitively 
perceived observing the increasing efforts, both intellectually and materially, dedicated 
to them, especially in the 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, despite all these great material 
and reflexive efforts and the fact that “build[ing a] sustainable peace is a major 
challenge facing the international community” in our time1, the reflection about such 
important and crucial theme, such as peace, still remains oddly marginal inside the 
discipline of International Relations (IR).2 
Certainly there is an impressive number of studies regarding peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping or state-building. However, their problematizations are often shallow 
                                                          
1  UNSC, UN Security Council 5895th Meeting SC/9333, 20th May 2008, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9333.doc.htm, (All websites hereinafter were last 
accessed on 1 July 2011), at 3. 
2  Oliver Richmond, Peace in International Relations, Abingdon 2008; Oliver Richmond, Reclaiming 
Peace in International Relations, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, (36, 3), 2008, 439-
470. 
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and most of them are underpinning by a ‘problem-solving’3 understanding of the world 
and consequently, in regard of the construction of international peace. In this way, 
much of the debates in the mainstream literature relate with, for example, how to 
classify the United Nation’s (UN) missions4, relevant factors for their effectiveness5, or 
even how this effectiveness might be measured.6 Although this kind of study is 
important and needed, they are often “under-theorized”7, frequently “idiosyncratic and 
atheoretical”8, engaging in enclosed discussions usually distant, or having no 
relationship at all, with IR9 or Political Science theories as a whole10, and generally 
having their inquiring narrowly limited by their policy relevance.11 It is precisely the 
critical analysis that evinces that this kind of reflection and epistemology regarding the 
international political policies in regard of peace are not neutral or impartial, quite the 
contrary, “[they] attempt to create and recreate a particular type of international 
order, (…) [where] the type of order sustained is a distinctly liberal one”.12 
In this context, this paper aims, from a critical position, to discuss this UN model 
regarding the transformations of the international violent conflicts. Departing from a 
Foucauldian standpoint, it is herein argued that the construction of peace in our time is 
an instrument of international normalization of ‘post-conflict’ states and their 
populations. This normalization operates through the government of ‘post-conflict’ 
states, through their discipline, and of their populations’ lives, through biopolitics, at a 
global scale. In order to elucidate such argument, the paper will, in a first moment, 
delineate the conflict-resolution mindset which state-building is commonly associated 
with and immersed. In a second moment, it will present the Foucauldian conceptual 
                                                          
3  For more in regard of the characteristics of problem-solving and critical reflections, see Robert 
Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Millennium 
– Journal of International Studies, (10, 2), 1981, 126-155. 
4  Virginia Page Fortna/Lise Morje Howard, Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature, 
Annual Review of Political Science, (11, 2), 2008, 283-301. 
5  Darya Pushkina, A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, 
International Peacekeeping, (13, 2), 2006, 133-149. 
6  Daniel Druckman/Paul C. Stern/Paul Diehl/A. Betts Fetherston/Robert Johansen/William 
Durch/Steven Ratner, Forum: Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions, Mershon International Studies 
Review, (41, 1), 1997, 151-165. 
7  Alex J. Bellamy, The 'next stage' in peace operations theory?, International Peacekeeping, (11, 1), 
2004, 17-38 at 1. 
8  Oldrich Bures, Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping, International Studies 
Review, (9) 2007, 407-436 at 1. 
9  Bellamy, The 'next stage' in peace operations theory?, 2. 
10  Roland Paris, Broadening the Study of Peace Operations, International Studies Review, (2, 3), 2000, 
27-44 at 1; 7. 
11  Paris, Broadening the Study of Peace Operations, 1. 
12  Alex Bellamy/Paul Williams, Introduction: Thinking anew about peace operations, International 
Peacekeeping, (11, 1), 2004, 1-15 at 8. 
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tools that enables the (re)problematization of the state-building practice as a post-
conflict dispositif, rather than merely a conflict-resolution tool. 
B Peace in the Post-Cold War Scenario 
Right after the World War II and during the whole period of the Cold War, the main 
UN activity in violent-conflict scenarios was peacekeeping, which usually meant the 
deployment of a small military force aiming just to monitor the ceasefire, or patrol, a 
neutral territory between former combatants.13 There were three important reasons 
for this aspect. The first one rests in the UN Charter. Even though peacekeeping 
operations are not mentioned anywhere in the Charter, the simple fact of being an UN 
action places its legal support inevitably in the UN Charter. There, any further action 
than the feature aforementioned is clearly prevented. Not only the refrain from the 
use of force is clear, but also the prevention of interference in matters, which are 
essentially domestic affairs of the states.14 Secondly, a general lack of agreement of the 
contending parts inhibited actions further than the monitoring or patrolling, since it 
would imply a greater intromission than what they would normally be willing to accept. 
Thirdly, the international scenario was pervasive with a bipolar mindset. This had, at 
least, three consequences: (1) the Soviet Union and the United States (US) were 
opposed to a more active UN in the domestic matter of their allies, or those under 
their area of influence; (2) in case of instability, both the Soviet Union and the US 
would deal directly with the matter, rather than allowing a third-party interference; 
and (3) with the intense ideological difference, there was little space for agreement 
regarding a model for the domestic governance in the ‘peacekept’ states.15 
For a long time, much of the reflection about peacekeeping was limited to diplomats 
and practitioners in the field.16 Hence, peacekeeping was initially reflected as simply a 
dispositive of “conflict management, conflict containment or conflict suppression, 
dealing within symptoms and not concerned with fundamental resolution”.17 Later, 
                                                          
13  Roland Paris/Timothy Sisk, Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar 
Statebuilding, in Roland Paris/Timothy Sisk, (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, New York 2009, 1-20 at 4. 
14  UN, United Nations "Charter of the United Nations" 24th October 1945, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml, at Article 2, Paragraphs 4 and 7. 
15  Paris/Sisk, Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding, 4. 
16  A.B. Fetherston, Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding: A reconsideration of 
theoretical frameworks, International Peacekeeping, (7, 1), 2000, 190-218 at 191. 
17  Oliver Ramsbotham/Tom Woodhouse, Introduction, International Peacekeeping, (7, 1), 2000, 1-7 
at 5. 
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mainly after the end of the Cold War, more fundamental questions of the conflicts 
started to be the main concern: its root causes. At this point, the reflection of the 
Peace Studies18, discipline which advocated the exercise of other activities beyond the 
simple cessation of violent hostilities between states, was recovered, incorporating the 
concern with the overcome of economic, political and social structures that prevent 
the satisfaction of the basic needs of the individuals in question. The main concern 
turned to the resolution of the conflicts and not their mere management.19 It is at this 
point that peacebuilding enters the UN’s vocabulary.  
Due to the high, and ever-growing, number of deployments on the one hand, and 
the enlargement and deepening of the activities performed over time on the other, 
two instruments have become particularly relevant to the UN’s engagement with 
violent conflicts throughout the globe: peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They are 
thought to respond to previous theoretical formulations, specifically to direct and 
structural violence20, but on a global scale. Having their primary focus on distinct, but 
complementary, temporal dimensions – the former focusing primarily on the short-
term and the latter on the long-term – they aim to overcome both forms of violence, 
moving from the accomplishment of a negative peace to the construction of a positive 
peace. It is precisely aiming to achieve a long-term positive peace that peacebuilding is 
employed by the UN as a key instrument. It is at the consolidation of this peace – 
usually thought as the (re)creation of political institutions, enhancing state capacity, and 
the functioning of the state-society relations – that state-building becomes a key 
activity regarding peacebuilding.21 
                                                          
18  For more regarding the Peace Studies see, for instance, Paul Rogers and Oliver Ramsbotham, Then 
and Now: Peace Research – Past and Future, Political Studies, (47, 4), 1999, 740-754; José Manuel 
Pureza/Teresa Cravo, Margem crítica e legitimação nos estudos para a paz, Revista Crítica de 
Ciências Sociais, (71, June), 2005, 5-19; Håkan Wiberg, Investigação para a Paz: Passado, Presente e 
Futuro, Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, (71, Junho), 2005, 21-42. 
19  Bures, Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping, 9-10. 
20  Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peach Research, Journal of Peace Research, (6, 3), 1969, 167-
191. 
21  Carrie Manning, Local Level Challenges to post-Conflict Peacebuilding, International Peacekeeping, 
(10, 3), 2003, 25-43; Lakhadar Brahimi, State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries, 
Presented at Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Building Trust in Government Vienna - 
Austria, 26-29 June 2007, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf, Roland 
Paris/Timothy Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations. Routledge, New York 2009 at Chapter 1. 
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1 Post-Conflict State-building 
State-building has become a crucial activity and one of the most pressing issues 
regarding peace in contemporary international relations. In nowadays’ international 
scenario, state-building is a pivotal instrument used to address issues regarding both 
the international security and development advancements. Despite the apparent 
distance between both discourses22, they are much closer than the inattentive look 
might perceive. It is their underlying rationale and the centrality of the question of 
‘fragility’ that bind them together. Both discourses have as their primary concern and, 
consequently, target, the ‘fragility’ of the states. This ‘fragility’, understood as “weak 
institutions and governance systems, and a fundamental lack of leadership, political will 
and/or capacity to deliver on key public goods, especially in terms of protecting the 
poor”23 is at the very heart of the state-building debate. Indeed, the whole state-
building agenda emerges as “a direct policy response to these conditions”.24 
According to an UNDP/World Bank’s25 policy paper delineating the role of state-
building on the world, it is the state’s ‘fragility’ that “directly threatens the security and 
wellbeing of populations within the territory of the state and wider regional and global 
security, and seriously retards progress towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals”. Additionally, ‘fragility’ is also often associated with violent 
conflicts, being their cause and consequence.26 Moreover, according to this notion, the 
states are the very bedrock of the international system. Therefore, the state ‘fragility’ 
threatens the very foundation of this system.27 Not by coincidence, the state-building, 
under this line of thought, is “one of the most important issues for the world 
community”28; it is one of the critical, moral and strategic imperatives of our time.29 
According to Ghani and Lockhart, the “solutions to our current problems of 
                                                          
22  Distance very much shortened by the elucidations, for instance, of Mark Duffield , Global 
Governance and the New Wars, Zed Books, London, 2001; Mark Duffield, Development, Security 
and Unending War - Governing the World of Peoples, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007. 
23  Sue Ingram, Key Concepts and Operational Implications in Two Fragile States: The Case of Sierra 
Leona and Liberia, The World Bank - UNDP, 2010 at 4. 
24  Ibid., at 5 
25  Ibid., at 4. 
26  Ibid., at 5. 
27  Robert Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in Robert 
Rotberg (ed.) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington D.C 2003, 1-28 
at 1. 
28  Francis Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century, 
Profile Book, London 2004 at ix. 
29  Robert Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair, in 
Robert Rotberg (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton 2004, 1-50 at 42. 
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insecurity, poverty, and lack of growth all converge on the need for a state-building 
project”.30 Therefore, state-building, according to this rationale, is not only important 
for the security, wellbeing, and peace of the populations of the state under this activity; 
it is a crucial instrument also for the security, wellbeing and peace of the whole globe. 
As such, state-building is perceived as a fundamental practice to the very maintenance 
of the international system. 
As a practice performed at the international scene in ‘post-conflict’ scenarios, state-
building31 has more than one understanding. A more loose view, assumes state-building 
as “the process through which states enhance their ability to function”.32 Other 
understandings are much more specific than this. At its narrower perspective, state-
building deals specifically with its immediate meaning; it focuses on the 
(re)construction of states through the strengthening and/or the (re)creation of its 
institutional apparatuses. In this understanding, ‘post-conflict’ state-building is a distinct 
phase of the reconstruction efforts which primary objective is the (re)construction of 
political institutions.33 This phase would be a part of the peacebuilding activity and 
would seek to create effective and legitimate governmental institutions34, which could 
be endowed with governance instruments and are therefore capable of providing 
physical and economic security to the citizens in question.35 In this understanding, 
state-building is intimately connected with state capacity36 and its internal governance.37 
In this view, state-building “refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to 
establish for the first time, effective and autonomous structures of governance in a 
state or territory where no such capacity exists or where it has been seriously 
                                                          
30  Ashraf Ghani/Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, 
Oxford 2008 at 4. 
31  For other contexts where ‘state-building’ might take place, see for example Verena Fritz/Alina 
Rocha Menocal, Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective - An Analytical 
and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International 
Engagement, Report for DFID’s Effective and Fragile States Teams September 2007, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1340.pdf, 17. 
32  Alan Whaites, States in Development: Understanding State-building, DFID Working Paper, 2008, at 
4. 
33  Christopher Bickerton, State-Building: exporting State-Failure, in Bickerton/Cunliffe/Gourevitch 
(eds.) Politics without Sovereignty: a critique of Contemporary International Relations, London 
2007, 93-111 at 96. 
34  Roland Paris/Timothy Sisk, Managing Contradictions: the Inherant Dilemmas of Postwar 
Statebuilding, http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/211/iparpps.pdf, at 1. 
35  Simon Chesterman, You, The People - The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-
building, Oxford 2004, at 5. 
36  Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century. 
37  Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair. 
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eroded”.38 Paris and Sisk’s definition of ‘post-conflict’ state-building as “the 
strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that 
are emerging from conflicts”39 best sums up this understanding. 
In a much wider sense, state-building is analyzed well beyond this primary 
institutional understanding. It is analyzed as an international engagement with the 
domestic governing mechanisms of other states and their respective societies. This 
understanding includes much more than the (re)construction and strengthening of 
state institutions, it also reflects upon the whole set of practices on which 
internationals focus on the management and regulation of state-society relations. 
Those practices might vary as international assistance to strengthening the regulatory 
capacity of the state, to conditionalities, debt relief, international loans, poverty 
reduction strategies, and many others.40 This is a more comprehensive understanding 
of state-building and allows the problematization of its practices not only during 
reconstruction periods, but also in a different set of engagement among states and 
international organizations. In a ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding setting, for instance, this 
would require the analyst to observe not only the ‘post-conflict’ state institutions that 
are being (re)constructed/strengthened, but also the whole set of practices that seek 
to shape and direct the relations between ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations. 
In both senses, the state-building can be seen as a social (re)engineering based on 
the transposition of values and ideas of the western world to war-torn societies. Either 
institutionally or through conditionalities, it can be said that the final objective is very 
much the same: the construction of liberal democracies. As already said, more often 
than not, the reflection about the construction of peace is centered on a ‘problem-
solving’ understanding of the world. Nevertheless, this way of seeing things tends to 
miss much of the picture. It tends to portray the state-building activity as a neutral 
conflict-resolution instrument and neglects the power relations entrenched in such 
process. Through a Foucauldian problematic though, one is enabled to see that the 
state-building activity might be problematized as an instrument of maintaining and 
promoting a certain international order, a liberal one. As such, it that this paper now 
turns to the elucidation of some Foucauldian conceptual tools. 
                                                          
38  Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction, 
Oxford 2005, 3. 
39  Paris/Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations, at 14. 
40  David Chandler, The Empire in Denial - The Politics of State-building, London 2006. 
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C Foucauldian Analytical Tools 
This paper aims to critically reflect about the construction of peace at the international 
level. It proposes the problematization of the state-building process through a 
Foucauldian problematic arguing that the construction of peace in our time is an 
instrument of international normalization of ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations. 
This normalization is argued to operate through the government of ‘post-conflict’ 
states and their populations’ lives at a global scale. The whole rhetoric, mechanisms 
and instruments of the state-building processes are portrayed as directed to the 
prevention and transformation of violent conflicts. Nevertheless, the state-building 
dispositif41 is a normalizing technology that ends up disciplining the ‘post-conflict’ states 
and biopolitically governing their populations. At the international level, this 
government operates through discipline, which works through instruments of knowing, 
assessing, monitoring, individualizing, ranking, rewarding and punishing individual ‘post-
conflict’ states. These include standardized data collection, performance benchmarking, 
auditing techniques, access to credit lines, funding of projects, conditionalities, 
sanctions, and so on. At the national level, government operates through biopolitics, 
which functions through the administration and control of life-supporting processes of 
the mass population, such as health, education, sanitation, movement, life, death, jobs, 
food, and so on, in these ‘post-conflict’ states. As a normalizing technology, the state-
building dispositif has a norm underpinning its activities which is the ultimate aim of its 
conducts. This norm is that the states should resemble liberal democracies. 
Usually, state-building is considered by problematizing each aspect of it or the 
performance of specific actors performing determined activities, and not the process 
as a whole. Consequently, what is usually visible is the observation of the constitution-
building efforts, the processes of money lending by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), feeding by World Food Program (WFP), security sector reforms, housing 
construction by the HABITAT, electoral processes assistance, development activities 
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the financing of reconstruction 
efforts by World Bank (WB) and so on, individually. It is seeking precisely to avoid this 
discrete and partial observation of the state-building processes that this paper uses the 
notion of state-building dispositif. 
                                                          
41  Usually the word dispositif used by Foucault is translated as ‘apparatus’ to English. Nevertheless, in 
order to avoid translation discussions or misperceptions Mark G. E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy 
of Michel Foucault, New York 2009, 174, FN 12, this paper uses the original word ‘dispositif’. 
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1 Dispositif 
Although not offering a complete definition, Foucault comes close to it while 
delineating what a dispositif is in an interview.42 He said:  
“What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid . Such are the 
elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements. 
(…) I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of - shall we say - formation which has 
as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. 
The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function.  
(…) I said that the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming 
that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them 
in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc. (…) This is 
what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and 
supported by, types of knowledge.”43 
Stretching even further the already loose Foucauldian understanding of dispositif, 
Agamben44 understands the dispositif as “anything that has in some way the capacity to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings”. With this in mind, to conceptualize 
the state-building as a dispositif brings a more comprehensive appreciation of the 
whole process than understanding it merely as a conflict-resolution tool. The elements 
of this state-building dispositif would be all the actors, theories, discourses, concepts, 
practices, instruments, institutions and so on, that are deployed to the shaping and 
conducting of ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations. This notion facilitates the 
understanding of distinct series of actions, experts, practices, procedures, concepts 
that may not be interrelated at all, and in fact could be very much conflicting, as part of 
one comprehensive and coherent whole. 
                                                          
42  Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? - And Other Essays, Stanford 2009, at 2. 
43  Michel Foucault, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, New York 1980, 194-196. 
44  Agamben, What is an Apparatus? - And Other Essays, at 14. 
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a  Operating Actors and Concepts 
Regarding the actors one might think of many agents that are part of this state-building 
dispositif. Those might be major organizations like the UN and its specialized agencies, 
the OSCE, the EU, the NATO, the OECD, other regional organizations, international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and WB, and national development 
agencies/departments like the USAID, AUSAID or the DFIF. Additionally, one might 
also think about the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that 
operate in ‘post-conflict’ scenarios, the consultants and experts hired for specific tasks, 
and also the local people and NGOs of the countries under state-building. Surely, all 
these actors operate different tasks, through diverse mechanisms and most often with 
distinct and, not rarely, conflicting objectives. Nevertheless, they all operate within this 
state-building dispositif. 
In order to operate smoothly, this state-building dispositif must make use of a set of 
theories and concepts. Perhaps the first operating concept used is the notion of ‘failed 
state’. This concept is at the heart of the very existence and need of the state-building 
dispositif. State-building emerges in the international scene in order to address the 
question of ‘fragility’ and this question is operationalized through the conceptualization 
of ‘failed states’. The concept emerges when the orthodox thinking, observing the 
international scene, problematizes the ‘fragility’ and the ‘lack of capacity’ of some state 
structures, or the ‘bad governance’ of them45 as source of both insecurity and 
underdevelopment. These states are ‘failed’ because they “no longer perform the 
[basic] functions required for them to pass as states”.46 These functions range from the 
provision of welfare and security to the border patrol and the rule-of-law 
enforcement. The state capacity to provide these functions is, therefore, central to this 
notion.47 According to the state-builders rationale, with these states unwilling48, or 
even unable49, to perform such critical tasks, space is wide open for them to become 
                                                          
45  Martin Doornbos, Fragile States or Failing Models? Accounting for the Incidence of State Collapse, 
in Martin Doornbos/Susan Woodward/Silvia Roque (eds.), Failing States or Failed States? The Role 
of Development Models: Collected Works, FRIDE Working Paper nº 19, Madrid 2006, 1-13 at 2. 
46  William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in William Zartman (ed.), 
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and the Restoration of Legitimate Authority, London and 
Boulder 1995, 1-11 at 5. 
47  Jonathan Hill, Beyond the Other? A postcolonial critique of the failed state thesis, African 
Identities, (3, 2), 2005, 139-154 at 45. 
48  Jean-Germain Gros, Towards a taxonomy of failed states in the new world order: decaying 
Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti, Third World Quarterly, (17, 3), 1996, 455-471. 
49  Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States, Oxford 2000. 
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“source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to drugs 
to terrorism”.50 
This ‘failed sated’ notion is very much connected with another operating concept of 
this state-building dispositif which is the reinterpretation of the concept of sovereignty. 
The idea of sovereignty always was the very bedrock of international relations. 
Nevertheless, a problematization focused on the state (in)capacity could hardly be 
developed without a differentiation and (re)categorization of the concept of 
sovereignty. One might think, for instance, of positive and negative sovereignty.51 The 
positive sovereignty is the possession of state characteristics de facto and de jure 
whereas the negative one is the absence of the de facto characteristics, even though 
possessing the de jure ones.52 In this rationale, it is precisely this “gap between de jure 
sovereignty and de facto sovereignty [that] is the key obstacle to ensuring global 
security and prosperity”.53 
These two operating concepts work together constructing the urgent need which 
the state-building dispositif must address. Connecting these two concepts, on the one 
hand, the state-building dispositif, while designed to address ‘fragility’, becomes 
urgently needed in order to enhance international security and wellbeing of global 
populations. On the other hand, while being portrayed as closing the ‘post-conflict’ 
states’ ‘sovereignty gap’, the state-building is not viewed as an external intervention. In 
fact, it is viewed as enhancing ‘post-conflict’ states capacity. Indeed, the state-building 
dispositif is presented as a beneficial relationship between the state-builders and state-
built actors, in the sense that the former are ‘reinforcing’ the sovereignty and 
independence of the latter. 
Another notion that is important to the operation of the state-building dispositif is 
‘good governance’. The idea of ‘governance’ frames the area of intervention. For the 
World Bank, governance means "the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”.54 Despite 
the importance of the term ‘governance’, what is the key operative word on the 
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notion is the adjective ‘good’. Here, it is perceptible that whereas the financial 
institutions emphasize specific macro-economic reforms, the political ones place more 
attention to democratic principles, human rights and rule of law.55 The implicit idea of 
this ‘good governance’ notion is that there is ‘bad’ governance. While there is a ‘good’ 
and ‘correct’ governance, the other side of the coin is that ‘bad’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
governance must be corrected. This correction would come through economic, 
political and social reforms such as the reduction of trading barriers and tariffs, 
privatization of state-owned properties, deregulation and liberalization of the 
economy, marketization of public services, budgetary discipline, respect for human 
rights, NGO engagement, rule of law and so on.56 This is a key element of the 
‘normalization’ process performed by the state-building dispositif on ‘post-conflict’ 
states and their populations.  
2 Normalization 
Problematizing the construction of the international peace as an instrument of 
normalization of the ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations and the state-building 
dispositif as a normalizing technology surely needs a delineation of what is meant by 
‘technology’ and ‘normalization’. The word ‘technology’ is herein used to capture the 
very essence of state-building processes. The pivotal element about technologies, in a 
Foucauldian sense, is that “they are technologies, not merely structures or discourses 
of power, though there are certainly discourses and structures involved”. This means 
that “they are, like other technologies, a body of technical knowledge and practices, a 
raft of techniques, which once developed and understood can be applied to various 
situations”. Additionally, they “are not socially or politically neutral but rather 
profoundly alter the way things operate in society”.57 Hence, the word ‘technology’ is 
used to place emphasis in the, already common-sense, standardized character of the 
state-building processes and their indiscriminately application in different ‘post-conflict’ 
scenarios across the world. 
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Regarding ‘normalization’, from the start, this notion operates through an 
underpinning ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ condition. In the ‘normalization’ process, one has 
“different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in 
establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and [in] 
acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable”.58 In a few words, 
the ‘abnormal’ ones must be intervened to become more like the ‘normal’ ones.59 
Hence, in a normalization process, the ‘normal’ is the primary element and the norm 
which the others must follow is deduced from it. In the international sphere, it is clear 
who the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are. The ‘normal’ would be the Western-liberal-
democratic states while the ‘abnormal’ would be the other states. The ‘norm’, 
according to which the states should resemble liberal democracies, is deduced from 
this notion. This ‘norm’ rests in the notion advanced by “Kant, Schumpeter, and many 
other contemporary authors, [that] have argued that liberalism has a pacifying effect 
through liberal, democratic principles which are the basis for state institutions, and 
through its adherence to free trade and capitalism”.60 
It is at this normalization process that the ‘failed state’ notion works perfectly. This 
is an a contrario concept, that is, it encompasses a subliminal, unspoken, dichotomy of 
what is a ‘successful’/’normal’ state61, which is the liberal-democratic one. The ‘failed 
states’ are thus portrayed as ‘abnormal’ states through analogies like “degenerative 
disease”62, “serious mental or physical illness”63, or even “dead leaves that accumulate 
in a forest”.64 Hence, to normalize these ‘abnormal’ states is to find instruments to 
implement this liberal-democracy ‘norm’ there. Therefore, the state-building dispositif 
emerges as a fit instrument to intervene in these states in order to normalize them and 
their populations, to make them resemble more like liberal democracies. 
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Understanding that this normalization process carried out by the state-building 
dispositif occurs through the government of ‘post-conflict’ states, operated through 
discipline, and their populations’ lives, operated through biopolitics, these conceptual 
tools must also be better elucidated. 
3 Government 
Reading the word government one of the very first things that might come to mind is, 
quite understandably, the state and the wide range of institutions it involves. A mental 
picture of large buildings, with wide corridors filled with public officials might even 
emerge. Within this understanding, the study of government eventually entails 
differentiating its systems as parliamentary or presidential, scrutinizing the distribution 
of power among the various levels and observing whether it is a federal or unitary 
state, and possibly classifying it as totalitarian, democratic, monarchic or anarchic.65 
Ultimately, questions may arise about all of this, i.e. ‘who holds the power?’, ‘how is 
this power legitimized?’, ‘is it representative?’, ‘what is the source of this power?’.66 
The Foucauldian understanding of government seeks exactly to develop an analytical 
framework that enables reflection on the political power exercised precisely outside, 
above, permeating, across and beyond the state.67 Briefly defining government as the 
‘conduct of conduct’68, Foucault enlarges its meaning to cover the scope adopted here, 
viz. “mechanisms and procedures destined to conduct men, to drive the conduct of 
men, to conduct the conduct of men”.69 Understanding government as the ‘conduct of 
conduct’, Foucault notoriously plays with the double meaning of the word ‘conduct’ 
and consciously sees it as “one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity 
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of power relations”.70 Whereas as a verb, ‘to conduct’, means to lead, to guide or to 
direct, as a noun, ‘conduct’ refers to the human actions and behaviours.71 Connecting 
these two meanings, government as ‘conduct of conduct’ “entails any attempt to shape 
with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behaviour according to particular sets 
of norms and for a variety of ends”.72. 
Understanding government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ frees the reflection about it 
from the common sense. Government in the Foucauldian sense is much more than the 
bureaucratic image that might emerge once reading the word, and consequentially, to 
govern becomes more than the mere management of the state structures. In fact, to 
govern, in this sense, means “to structure the possible field of action of others”.73 
Hence, government becomes an activity that does not operates solely at the state 
level, but indeed turns out to be apparent in the every-day aspects and places of an 
ordinary life such as at schools, factories, hospitals, business enterprises, religious sites, 
families and so on. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that government works 
simultaneously and complementarily with other Foucauldian technologies of power 
such as discipline and biopolitics. To clarify this, Foucault alludes to the image of a 
triangle composed by these technologies which has the population as its target.74 As 
such, power can be exercised at the conduction of behaviors, of individuals and 
populations at once, ensuring the life improvement of each and all of them.75 
The activity of government is “inextricably bound up with the activity of thought 
[and] (…) made possible by and constrained by what can be thought and what cannot 
be thought”.76 It is precisely this exercise of thinking when one governs the other that 
leads to the idea of governmentality.77 Foucault understood governmentality, more 
than anything, as an “analytical grip” to analyze the relations of power, a framework to 
analyze distinct means whereby one tries to shape and direct the behavior of the other 
and oneself on various scales and different fields, such as delinquents of a society, the 
economic policy of a state, the management of a whole social body, and so on.78 
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Through this notion, it is possible to “explore the regularities of everyday existence 
that structure the ‘conduct of conduct’”79 of individuals and whole populations. Hence, 
it stands for a “range of forms of actions and fields of practice aimed in a complex way 
at steering individuals and collectivities”.80 
 
4 Discipline and Biopolitics 
During the modern period Foucault observes the emergence of two technologies of 
power that supplemented the sovereign power. They are the ‘discipline’ and the 
‘biopower’. Whereas the sovereign power was exercised through killing, the discipline 
and biopower are exercised through correcting and enhancing life respectively. The 
key understanding of those techniques of power visualized by Foucault is that they 
operate in different levels and scales; they operate through different instruments. This 
fact is what allows one technique to exist without the extinction of the other. Indeed, 
it allows that these techniques can function simultaneously. 
Discipline is a technology of power that is essentially exercised on individuals and 
mainly concerned with the production of their behaviors. Therefore, it can be 
understood as a micro-political power.81 Discipline is a type of power that is very much 
connected to the notion, previously presented, of normalization. Indeed, the ultimate 
aim of discipline is to normalize. It is in essence a process that seeks to correct the 
behaviors of deviant individuals. The operative word here is certainly the adjective 
deviant. In this sense, the disciplinary mechanism visualizes what should be the correct 
behavior and mold the incorrect ones toward this model. 
Underpinning this disciplinary mechanism there are the processes of 
individualization and ranking. The individualization process is the one that makes sure 
that, for example, a mass of subjects can be treated individually. Nevertheless, through 
ranking, these individuals are always problematized in relation to other individuals. 
Hence, rank definition is a key element of the process.82 In fact, “discipline is the ark of 
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rank”83; it is through ranking that discipline can hierarchizes the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ individuals in relation to one another.84 The closest the 
individual is from the adopted ‘norm’, the better ranked he/she is. Hence, those with 
low ranks must be intervened in order to resemble more like those better ranked. 
The ranking “has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and 
aptitudes, but it also punishes and rewards”.85 It is through the punishing and rewarding 
technique that ‘abnormal’ behaviors are molded and corrected, and the ‘normal’ ones 
invested and stimulated. Through this process, the individuals are “situated in a 
network of relations and defined by their position within it. (…) [R]anks reinforces 
discipline through mechanisms of reward/punishment such as promotion/demotion; [it] 
establishes systems of performance assessment and comparison linked to measurable 
criteria”.86 Hence, discipline constantly “compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, 
homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes”.87 
On the opposite pole of discipline, biopower operates on another level; biopower is 
a macro-political power. It is exercised on the collectivity having the population as its 
target.88 It is a power concerned with men as a living-being89; hence it is fundamentally 
exercised on the population’s life. Therefore, rather than an “anatomo-politics of the 
human body” what is perceived is a “’biopolitics’ of the human race”.90 Biopolitics thus 
aims to “the management and regulation of the population, the species body and its 
demographic characteristics”.91 It is a power that seeks the management and the 
administration of the processes of life at the level of the population. 
Hence, biopolitics starts to problematize a whole set of phenomena that bind the 
population together, that makes it a whole. It problematizes all the “the mechanisms of 
life and serving as the basis of the biological processes”.92 Biopolitics is concerned thus 
with phenomena like birth, death, production, illness, fertility, health, life expectancy, 
                                                          
83  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, New York [1975] 1995, at 146. 
84  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, at 181. 
85  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, at 181. 
86  Zanotti, Imagining Democracy, Building Unsustainable Institutions: The UN Peacekeeping 
Operation in Haiti, at 552. 
87  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, at 183. 
88  Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, at 43. 
89  Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, New York [1976] 2003, at 242. 
90  Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, at 243. 
91  Barry Smart, Key Sociologists - Michel Foucault, New York 2002, at 99. 
92  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality - Volume I: An Introduction, New York [1976] 1978, at 
139. 
Ramon Blanco              Conflict Resolution in War-Torn Societies? 
 
Série Comunicações, FEUC, 2011                 19 
housing, education and so on, and with all the conditions that might influence them.93 
Hence, biopolitics acts in two directions: not only at the life-supporting processes per 
se, but also at theirs surrounding conditions, at the environment that influences those 
processes. Ultimately, biopolitics acts where the population’s lives might be sustained 
or retarded.94 Hence, the emergence of such power designates precisely “the moment 
at which the complex phenomena of human existence were submitted to the 
calculation and order of knowledge and power”.95 
Whereas discipline had as its ultimate goal to correct the deviant individual, 
biopolitics targets the life-supporting processes in order to invest and foster life. Its 
ultimate goal is to enhance life quality and its conditions. Hence, the objective is not to 
kill or correct the individual, but to intervene at the level of the generality of the life-
supporting phenomena. To intervene in such a way, biopolitics makes use of 
instruments, techniques and institutions different from sovereignty’s and discipline’s. 
This happens through the implementation of a whole set of instruments and 
institutions that ensure the enhancement of vital processes of the population. 
Regarding the instruments, one might think of all the instruments directed to mass 
populations like “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures”96 and 
“techniques of mass surveillance, such as the census, and of mass control, such as 
health campaigns”.97 Regarding the institutions, one might think, for instance, of health, 
education, welfare, employment, sanitation or feeding systems.98 
Apart from those instruments and institutions, biopolitics makes also use of the 
notion of average. Through the establishment of averages, what biopolitics seeks is to 
preserve an equilibrium intervening on the deviations. It is with this in mind that one 
can think that “the mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to 
be increased; [or] the birth rate has to be stimulated”.99 In doing so, biopolitics takes 
control of the vital processes of ‘man-as-species’ and as a result life can be fostered 
and consequently managed, so life ends up being regularized100 and normalized. Here, 
the norm also plays a key role, since it circulates between both discipline and 
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biopolitics.101 As Foucault properly remembers, “[t]he norm is something that can be 
applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to 
regularize”.102  
Hence, in a normalization processes happening in the international scenario through 
the construction of peace, not only the ‘post-conflict’ states are intervened in sense to 
normalize them, to make them to behave in accordance to the established ‘norm’, but 
also their relationship with their own populations and how the populations itself 
should behave are intervened. As such, the ‘post-conflict’ state is not only disciplined 
through rewards and punishments in order to correct its deviant behavior, its 
population is also target of a biopolitical power which seeks to control and manage all 
aspects surrounding its life. 
D Concluding Remarks 
With all this in mind, it is possible to start to problematize the state-building as a 
normalization technology at a global scale, as a government process that occurs at 
both the state and the population levels of ‘post-conflict’ states. At the state level, the 
discipline would be perceived mapping out instruments of knowing, assessing, 
monitoring, individualizing, codifying, ranking, rewarding and punishing individual ‘post-
conflict’ states. Those might be majorly elements like maps, standardized data 
collection/reporting, statistics benchmarks, performance indicators, auditing 
techniques, accesses to lines of credit, project funding, conditionalities, even sanctions. 
This entails elucidating aspects such as: through what mechanisms the UN engagement 
is monitored; how ‘progress’/‘regression’ is assessed; what sort of projects are more 
likely to be financed/rejected, or initiatives to be encouraged/discredited. It aims at 
clarifying the kinds of conduct that the ‘post-conflict’ state is subject to 
rewards/punishments, elucidating how, when, and through what instruments the 
incentives/corrections occur. 
At the population’s level, whereas sovereignty might be mapped out through 
instruments like the writing of constitutions, passing of laws or the construction of 
parliaments, biopolitics might be examined focusing on the dynamics fostering the 
‘post-conflict’ populations’ life, managing and controlling life-supporting processes of 
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the mass population of the ‘post-conflict’ intervened state. Evincing biopolitics entails 
elucidating the processes performed in areas aimed at the population, such as health, 
education, jobs, movement, feeding and so on. 
Instead of observing distinct spheres of state-building activities, it would be more 
clarifying problematizing all these practices as part of a state-building dispositif. In this 
way it would be clearer that these activities often end up disciplining the ‘post-conflict’ 
states and biopolitically governing their populations. Rather than disparate, and 
sometimes conflicting activities, they all aim to normalize the ‘post-conflict’ states and 
their populations. Ultimately, they are all part of a normalization process which aims to 
implement a non-written ‘norm’ in the international scenario, which is that the states 
should resemble liberal democracies. 
